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Abstract: This paper examines a two-echelon supply chain with an upstream supplier (she) and a 11 
downstream manufacturer (he) transacting an intermediate product via direct bilateral contracting and 12 
futures market channels with differentiated productivities. A game model is established to examine the 13 
dual-channel supply chain operations. Analytical results reveal that downstream productivity 14 
improvement (DPI) through the bilateral interaction is necessary and sufficient for the supply chain 15 
members to trade in the bilateral channel in addition to the futures market. We show that, when the 16 
price in the futures market increases, the manufacturer would purchase less from the futures market 17 
and more from the supplier, which not only increases the supplier’s expected profit but also increases 18 
her risk (variance of the profit) in equilibrium. Furthermore, we find that when the bilateral channel 19 
exhibits stronger DPI, the manufacturer obtains a higher expected profit and bears a higher risk, but the 20 
supplier enjoys a higher expected profit without incurring any additional risk.  21 
 22 






1. INTRODUCTION 26 
With the support of the internet, electronic marketplaces provide competitive secondary (spot) 27 
market channels for firms in a supply chain to trade their products. Such spot market channels may 28 
help mitigate the double-marginalization problem and, hence, improve supply chain efficiency. At the 29 
same time, firms trading in spot markets also bear a great deal of risks associated with volatile spot 30 
prices. However, futures markets, such as the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), the New York 31 
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and the London Metal Exchange (LME), offer firms an alternative 32 
market channel to trade various commodities such as crude oil, metals, and plastics. Not only can 33 
futures markets enhance supply chain efficiency, but they can also be used to hedge against spot price 34 
risks.  35 
Nowadays, the utilization of spot and/or futures markets is widely observed in practice. For 36 
example, HP’s TradingHubs.com, a web-based secondary market, accommodated transactions of over 37 
$45 million of parts and products from July 1999 to April 2000 (Lee and Whang, 2002). As for futures 38 
markets, Newman (2009) reports that, in the 2000s, an average of 30%-40% of the total trading 39 
activities for the coffee “C” contracts in the New York Board of Trade are made up by commercial 40 
traders who, unlike non-commercial traders such as hedgers and speculators conducting only financial 41 
trade, engage in physical commodity transactions with actual deliveries. Despite increasing popularity 42 
of e-markets, supply chain partners still use bilateral contracts for most transactions in the real business 43 
world. According to Electronics Business Network’s 2002 poll of 150 original equipment 44 
manufacturers and their service providers, 72% of their procurement spending was executed through 45 




Laughlin (2003) reports that 54% of the trading in the electric power market covered by PJM 47 
Interconnection was completed through bilateral transactions. 48 
This co-existence of market trading and bilateral contracting arouses researchers in the field of 49 
supply chain and operations management to study why firms in a supply chain still transact by bilateral 50 
contracts in the presence of the more efficient market trading. They introduce spot market trading to 51 
supply chain models and furnish four different interpretations for the need of bilateral contracting to 52 
complement spot market trading: risk hedging (Dong and Liu, 2007), potential productivity 53 
improvement (Cohen and Agrawal, 1999; Levi et al., 2003), strategic threats under trigger strategies 54 
(Tunca and Zenios, 2006), and the price impact of buyers’ strategic purchase in the spot market 55 
(Mendelson and Tunca, 2007). For more detailed survey on relationship between (spot) market trading 56 
and supply chain operations, readers are referred to Haksöz and Seshadri (2007) and Kleindorfer and 57 
Wu (2003). 58 
However, little attention is paid to the impact of futures market trading on the negotiation of 59 
bilateral contracts in supply chains, although a few authors analyze optimization models where futures 60 
trading is assumed to hedge spot price risks (see, for example, Haksöz and Seshadri (2011)). Intuitively, 61 
if supply chain members trade in a futures market for actual deliveries, they can make commitments in 62 
terms of selling or buying a portion of intermediate products to strategically affect the following 63 
negotiation of their bilateral contracts. In this paper, we thus establish a three-stage game model to 64 
study the strategic role of committing to futures trading and to explore a new motivation for supply 65 
chain members to use the bilateral channel.  66 




uncertain unit production cost and a downstream manufacturer with stochastic final market demand. 68 
Both members have access to a futures market to trade an intermediate product. In addition to the 69 
futures trading channel, the transaction can also be completed by signing a bilateral wholesale price 70 
contract. Before negotiating the contract, the supplier (manufacturer) decides her (his) quantity to sell 71 
(buy) in the futures market at an observed futures price. After the bilateral contract is signed, the 72 
uncertain production cost for the supplier and the uncertain market demand for the manufacturer are 73 
realized, and both members fulfill their obligations set by the futures market and the wholesale price 74 
contract. Finally, the manufacturer sells the final product to consumers as per the realized demand. 75 
In our model, we assume that the bilateral (contracting) channel improves the manufacturer’s 76 
productivity compared with the futures market channel. This assumption is consistent with the general 77 
idea (as demonstrated in Cohen and Agrawal, 1999, Levi et al., 2003, Ulrich and Barney, 1984) that 78 
direct interactions through bilateral contracting rather than market trading help forge a better 79 
cooperation link, thereby improving productivities across the supply chain.  80 
By analyzing the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, we make a four-fold contribution to 81 
the literature. Firstly, we find that DPI is a necessary and sufficient condition for the supply chain to 82 
transact through bilateral contracting in the presence of the futures market, thereby establishing an 83 
alternative DPI interpretation for a positive bilateral transaction on top of Mendelson and Tunca’s 84 
(2007) strategic price impact explanation and the strategic threats under trigger strategies in a repeated 85 
game setting in Taylor and Plambeck (2007a, 2007b). Secondly, it is shown that when DPI exists, ex 86 
ante commitment to futures market trading allows the equilibrium contract to be independent of the 87 




independence result is that prior commitment to futures trading helps mitigate double marginalization. 89 
Thirdly, with a given DPI level, a higher futures price leads to a higher trading quantity at a heightened 90 
wholesale price in the bilateral channel, leading to a lower (higher) expected profit for the 91 
manufacturer (supplier) with a lower (higher) variance. This highlights that the futures price can serve 92 
as an indicator for supply chain managers to predict the change of bilateral contracting relations and 93 
the corresponding performance outcomes. This result is consistent with the price-to-be-fixed 94 
contracting practice in coffee supply chains where the contracted price is the futures price plus a 95 
quality adjustment (Bargawi and Newman, 2017; Starbucks, 2010) and Adcock’s (2006) appeal for 96 
(upstream) producers and (downstream) consumers to adopt the (LME) futures price as a benchmark 97 
for their (bilateral) price negotiations. Fourthly, for a given futures price, an increased DPI level 98 
strengthens the bilateral relation with a higher proportion of final product from the bilateral channel at 99 
an elevated wholesale price, and the result yields a win-win performance scenario, in which both the 100 
supplier and the manufacturer achieve a higher expected profit with different risk implications. This 101 
result furnishes a plausible way to understand the asymmetric reliance on relationship-based 102 
collaborations and different motivations for these collaborations observed in the B2B relationship 103 
management literature (Collins and Burt, 1999; Allen, 2001; Hingley, 2005; Nyaga et al., 2010).   104 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We briefly review related literature in Section 105 
2. Section 3 presents a three-stage game model to describe our supply chain setting. The corresponding 106 
subgame perfect equilibrium is derived in Section 4. Section 5 reports how the futures price and DPI 107 
affect supply chain operations and the corresponding implications on profitability and the associated 108 




Appendix A.  110 
 111 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW   112 
Motivated by the electronic marketplace TradingHubs.com, Lee and Whang (2002) triggers an 113 
interest to study how competitive market trading complements bilateral contract transactions in supply 114 
chains. A central question is why supply chain members still transact by bilateral contracts given that 115 
more efficient markets are available to buy or sell intermediate products. Dong and Liu (2007) view a 116 
bilateral contract as a forward contract between a supplier and a manufacturer in a supply chain and 117 
establish that the risk-hedging benefit justifies the prevalent existence of bilateral contracting within 118 
supply chains in the presence of open market trading. Mendelson and Tunca (2007) demonstrate that 119 
spot market trading improves supply chain channel profit and consumer surplus. However, due to the 120 
strategic impact on the equilibrium price of the spot market, it does not eliminate bilateral fixed-price 121 
contracting even if these contracts are signed under inferior information.  122 
Another line of research adopts the concept of the so-called relational contract to understand 123 
long-term collaborations among supply chain members. Tunca and Zenios (2006) model an e-market 124 
clearing mechanism between multiple suppliers and a set of manufacturers as a price-based auction 125 
and reveals conditions for these two venues to coexist and conditions under which one is preferred to 126 
the other. The authors point out that the auction-based market trading does not necessarily increase 127 
supply chain channel profit or consumer surplus. Without considering market trading, Taylor and 128 
Plambeck (2007a) provide two types of simple relational contracts (i.e. price-only and 129 




From the viewpoint of a supply chain system, Taylor and Plambeck (2007b) derive a general optimal 131 
relational contract that specifies a lump-sum transfer and a quantity-contingent payment from the 132 
buyer to the seller, a demand-dependent order, and the seller’s capacity investment. They show with 133 
two simpler versions of relational contracts (i.e. no-monitoring and capacity- inspection contracts) that 134 
both contracts perform well for a broad range of parameters.  135 
A different body of literature explores some “physical” aspects of bilateral contracting relations in 136 
supply chains. Cohen and Agrawal (1999) study a buyer’s trade-off between short-term (spot trading) 137 
and long-term contracts, where the latter possesses productivity improvement opportunities. The 138 
contracting market model of Levi et al. (2003) indicates that low relationship-specific investment leads 139 
to extensive use of contract trading. Both Cohen and Agrawal (1999) and Levi et al. (2003) recognize 140 
that long-term contracting requires some specific investment, which in turn leads to operational cost 141 
savings at one or more firms in a supply chain. This cost saving may take different forms such as 142 
rekeying cost and clerical expenses under EDI (Dearing, 1990), monitoring costs due to a reduction of 143 
opportunistic behavior by reducing the investor’s bargaining power (Ulrich and Barney, 1984), and 144 
maintenance and smoothing costs (Levi et al., 2003). Cost savings via bilateral contracting can be 145 
interpreted as increased production efficiency or productivity.  146 
Our paper has the following major differences from the aforementioned literature. Firstly, our 147 
model is different from the problem considered by Cohen and Agrawal (1999) as their research is 148 
essentially an optimization model from the buyer’s perspective. Secondly, our exposition differs from 149 
that reported by Levi et al. (2003) as they investigate how the contracting market equilibrium is 150 




operations are affected by potential productivity improvement resulted from bilateral contracting 152 
instead of strategic threats under trigger strategies (Taylor and Plambeck, 2007a; 2007b). Fourthly, 153 
Dong and Liu (2007) reveal the risk hedging motivation of bilateral contracting. We focus on the 154 
strategic role of futures market trading in the bilateral contract negotiation. Finally, but more 155 
importantly, the endogenously determined spot price in equilibrium in Mendelson and Tunca (2007) 156 
validates the price impact of strategic spot market trading on fixed-price contracting and a high enough 157 
level of the price impact leads to a positive contract transaction. In contrast, the model here assumes 158 
that supply chain members are engaged in futures trading and the quantities herein do not have any 159 
(futures) price impact on bilateral contract negotiation. This makes downstream productivity 160 
improvement (DPI) a potential factor for explaining a positive contracting transaction 161 
3. THE MODEL 162 
Consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of an upstream supplier and a downstream 163 
manufacturer. The two members use a wholesale price contract to trade an intermediate product. The 164 
manufacturer may also purchase the intermediate product from the futures market, and the supplier 165 
may also sell her intermediate product via the futures market. The manufacturer uses the intermediate 166 
product to produce his final product with an uncertain market demand. The market price of the 167 
manufacturer’s final product, defined as p, is characterized by an inverse demand function 168 
mp a bQ                                       (1) 169 
where 2(0, )N    representing market uncertainty, and mQ  is the total output quantity of the 170 
manufacturer’s final product demanded in the final market. 171 




bilateral contract with the supplier and the futures market. We use sq  to denote the manufacturer’s 173 
procurement quantity from the supplier and mfq  to represent the manufacturer’s procurement 174 
quantity from the future market, respectively. Additionally, we assume that bilateral contracting 175 
facilitates downstream productivity improvement (DPI). Therefore, the total output quantity of the 176 
manufacturer’s final product, mQ , can be described as 177 
m s mfQ kq q                                       (2) 178 
where 1k   measures the manufacturer’s relative productivity improvement for the procured 179 
intermediate products from the bilateral contracting channel compared to those obtained from the 180 
futures market. When 1k  , bilateral contracting does not have any productivity enhancement for the 181 
manufacturer and a higher k indicates a higher improvement level. The productivity improvement in 182 
bilateral contracting is usually attributed to long-term relationship-specific investment that has been 183 
made through repeated transactions in the past and is often assumed sunk. For instance, Cohen and 184 
Agrawal (1999) and Levi et al. (2003) treat this cost saving as an exogenous and, thus, sunk, prior to 185 
contract negotiation.  186 
Dong and Liu (2007) have identified the risk-hedging benefits for bilateral contracts against the 187 
volatile spot market. In this paper, we aim to show that DPI alone induces bilateral contracts. To 188 
exclude spot price risks, we assume that the supplier (manufacturer) obtains a fixed unit revenue (cost), 189 
i.e., ( )F a  in the futures market channel. Note that in our model, we assume that the supplier sells 190 
and the manufacturer buys at the same futures price. In reality, the manufacturer and the supplier may 191 
trade in the futures market at different physical time points and, thus, at different futures prices. To 192 




manufacturer buys at F , where F  can be positive or negative. Under this alternative assumption, 194 
we can still prove that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and derive it in a closed 195 
form. Furthermore, we can show that there exists a threshold, F , such that for all ),( FFF  , 196 
all the managerial implications (in Section 5) still hold. For more details, please refer to Appendix B. 197 
Let w  be the unit wholesale price charged by the supplier to the manufacturer for the 198 
intermediate product. Thus, the manufacturer’s profit function can be written as 199 
[ ( )]( )m s mf s mf s mfa b kq q kq q wq Fq         200 
As in Dong and Liu (2007), we assume that both the supplier and the manufacturer are 201 
risk-averse and have mean-variance preference over their risky profits. Risk-averse decision-makers 202 
are empirically observed in the literature (e.g. Cramer et al., 2002; Willebrands et al., 2012; 203 
Cucculelli and Ermini, 2013), and, as suggested by Kirkwood’s (2004) simulation results, an 204 
exponential utility function is an appropriate choice to represent risk-averse decision-makers’ 205 
preferences. In theory, a mean-variance preference can be justified by the certainty equivalence of the 206 
expected utility with an exponential utility function and a normally distributed uncertainty (Mascell et 207 
al. 1995). Therefore, we use certainty equivalence as the objective functions for both the manufacturer 208 
and the supplier. More specifically, we below assume both firms have exponential utility functions 209 
with Arrow-Pratt absolute risk measures of s  and m  (where subscripts “s” and “m” represent the 210 
supplier and the manufacturer, respectively) and the uncertainties of the manufacturer’s demand and 211 
the supplier’s cost follow normal distributions.  212 
With the normality assumption of  , the exponential utility function and a large enough a  (for 213 




certainty equivalence is expressed as 215 
2 21 1var [ ( )]( ) ( )
2 2m m m m s mf s mf s mf m s mf
CV E a b kq q kq q wq Fq kq q                 (3) 216 
Assume that the supplier has a sufficiently large capacity and her unit production cost c  is 217 
stochastic and 20( , )cc N c   where 00 c F   and 
2
c  is sufficiently small relative to 218 
0F c (for example, 03 c F c   ). The assumption of random unit cost for the supplier reflects the 219 
uncertainty in her procurement process of raw materials. The supplier can sell her intermediate product 220 
to the manufacturer directly or to the futures market. Hence, the supplier’s profit function is 221 
( )s s sf s sfwq Fq c q q      222 
where sq  and sfq  are the quantities that the supplier sells to the manufacturer at the unit wholesale 223 
price w and to the futures market at unit price F, respectively.  224 




var ( ) ( )
2 2s s s s s sf s sf s c s sf
CV E wq Fq c q q q q                      (4) 226 
In our model, the decision sequence is as follows. In stage 0, based on an observed futures price F, 227 
the manufacturer and the supplier choose mfq  and sfq  simultaneously. Then the supplier decides w  228 
in stage 1. In stage 2, the manufacturer determines sq  as per the wholesale price w  selected by the 229 
supplier. Finally, the supplier’s unit cost c  is realized, the supplier produces s sfq q , and the 230 
manufacturer receives s mfq q  from the supplier and the futures market. The final market 231 
uncertainty   is realized and the manufacturer sells his full production s mfkq q  in the final market 232 
at the market-clearing price according to the inverse demand function (1).  233 




trading prior to negotiating their bilateral contract. The decision sequence that mfq   and sfq   are 235 
chosen prior to determining w and qs in the bilateral contract allows us to examine the impact of 236 
futures commitments on bilateral contract relations and supply chain operations.  237 
    Finally, all mathematical notations are listed in Table 1. 238 
Table 1 Summary of Notations 239 
Symbol                            Description 
s , m     The supplier’s and the manufacturer’s Arrow-Pratt absolute risk measure 
          The normally distributed random shock of the final market demand with an expected value of zero 
2
         The variance of the random shock of the final market demand 
a, b        The market size and the slope of the (expected) final market demand 
p , mQ      The market-clearing price and the total output quantity of the manufacturer’s product in the final      
           market 
c          The normally distributed random unit cost of the supplier 
0c ,
2
c      The expected value and variance of the supplier’s random unit cost 
k          The parameter indicating the downstream productivity improvement (DPI)  
sq         The quantity of intermediate products transacted between the supplier and the manufacturer 
w         The supplier’s unit wholesale price for the intermediate product sold to the manufacturer  
sfq , mfq     The supplier’s and the manufacturer’s respective quantity traded in the futures market 
F          The futures price for the intermediate product 
s , m     The supplier’s and the manufacturer’s profit 
sCV , mCV  The supplier’s and the manufacturer’s certainty equivalence 
 240 
4. THE EQUILIBRIUM 241 
As specified in the sequence of events in Section 3, our model is a three-stage game including 242 
stages 0, 1, and 2. Following backward induction, we solve the last stage first. In stage 2, the 243 
manufacturer chooses sq  to maximize mCV  given in (3). Since it is straightforward to show mCV  244 
is concave in sq , the first-order condition immediately implies that the manufacturer’s optimal 245 






22 mB b    .  247 
Lemma 1: In stage 2, given mfq , sfq , and w , the manufacturer’s optimal order quantity from the 248 






   
 
                         (5) 250 
In stage 1, the supplier determines w  to maximize sCV  in (4). Substituting (5) into (4), one can 251 
easily rewrite sCV  and confirm its concavity in w . Thus, the first-order condition of the supplier’s 252 
maximization problem directly implies that the supplier’s optimal response (in terms of an optimal 253 
wholesale price) can be given in Lemma 2. For notational convenience, let 
def
2
s cA   . 254 
Lemma 2: In stage 1, given mfq  and sfq , anticipating the manufacturer’s optimal response (5), the 255 










          
   

                      (6) 257 
Lemma 2 indicates that the wholesale price decreases in mfq  but increases in sfq . That is, if the 258 
manufacturer strategically purchases more of the intermediate product from the futures market, the 259 
supplier has to lower her unit wholesale price charged to the manufacturer, benefiting the manufacturer; 260 
on the other hand, if the supplier strategically sells more in the futures market, the supplier can charge a 261 
higher unit wholesale price in the bilateral channel, resulting in a benefit for the supplier. Therefore, 262 
both the manufacturer and the supplier have incentives to trade in the futures market prior to their 263 
contract negotiation, and their commitments to a higher quantity in the futures market trading will 264 




Now, we turn to stage 0 of our model, in which the manufacturer and the supplier play a 266 
simultaneous-move game by selecting mfq  and sfq , respectively. With (5) and (6), the 267 
manufacturer’s and the supplier’s certainty equivalence can be rewritten as 268 
( , ( ( , )), ( , ))m mf s mf sf mf sfCV q q w q q w q q  and ( , ( ( , )), ( , ))s sf s mf sf mf sfCV q q w q q w q q , respectively. One 269 
can directly verify that mCV  is concave in mfq  
and sCV  is concave in sfq . Then it is sufficient to 270 
use the first-order conditions to characterize the stage-0 interaction. 271 





           ( ( , ))                                                               (7)
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where the second equality holds since the manufacturer’s first-order condition / 0m sCV q   holds 274 
(or equivalently (5) holds). 275 
In (7), F  is the manufacturer’s cost of buying an extra unit of the intermediate product in the 276 
futures market while the bracketed terms represent a cost saving in the purchase in the bilateral channel. 277 
Thus the manufacturer’s optimal decision of his futures market trading quantity is determined by a 278 
trade-off between these two terms. By solving the manufacturer’s first-order condition, we obtain 279 
Lemma 3.  280 
Lemma 3: Anticipating the optimal responses (5) and (6), for any sfq  chosen by the supplier, the 281 




3 3 2 2
0
2 2 2 2 2 2
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   
     
 .   (9) 283 
Lemma 3 directly implies that mfq
 
decreases in F. Intuitively, when the price of the intermediate 284 
product in the futures market (F) increases, the manufacturer tends to order less from the futures 285 
market.   286 
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In (10), F  is the supplier’s revenue of selling an extra unit of the intermediate product in the 289 
futures market while the bracketed terms represent the supplier’s increased cost of producing the extra 290 
unit. Thus, the supplier’s optimal sales quantity to the futures market is induced by a trade-off between 291 
her marginal revenue and marginal cost of producing an extra unit. Based on the supplier’s first-order 292 
condition, we reach Lemma 4.  293 
Lemma 4: Anticipating the optimal responses (5) and (6), for any mfq chosen by the manufacturer, 294 








q ca k B A F
q
k kB A k BA

                            (12) 296 
Lemma 4 indicates that sfq
 
increases in F. Intuitively, when the price of the intermediate 297 
product in the futures market (F) increases, the supplier would like to sell more to the futures market.  298 
  Here, we focus on the case in which 0mfq   and 0sfq   in equilibrium so that the supplier 299 




manufacturer only procures his input from the futures market but never sells to it. These conditions 301 
imply that the supplier and the manufacturer are “real” business entities (or commercial traders) that 302 
produce and deliver physical goods and do not participate as arbitrageurs in the futures market. 303 
With Lemmas 1-4, we are now ready to present the subgame perfect equilibrium by solving (9) 304 
and (12) for non-negative *mfq  and 
*
sfq , which are subsequently plugged into (5) and (6) to solve for 305 
*w  and *sq . These results are summarized in Proposition 1. 306 
Proposition 1: Keeping other parameters constant, there exist thresholds #B  and )(# Ba  for each 307 
)( #BB   such that if #BB   and )(# Baa  , our three-stage game has a unique subgame perfect 308 
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where all these decisions in equilibrium are non-negative.  312 
The threshold conditions in Proposition 1 simply ensure that neither the supplier nor the 313 
manufacturer is a hedger or a speculator who just uses the futures market trading as a financial 314 
instrument, instead, they are commercial traders who settle the futures contract with actual delivery. 315 
With the definition of 
def
22 mB b    , the condition 
#BB   represents a non-trivial operational 316 
scenario where the final market demand is inelastic enough, the manufacturer is risk-averse enough, or 317 
the final market is risky enough. The condition #( )a a B  simply means that the expected market size is 318 
large enough. For the remainder of this paper, we assume that these two conditions are satisfied. 319 




manufacturer ( *sq ) in equilibrium are independent of the manufacturer’s expected market demand (a ) 321 
and the supplier’s expected unit production cost ( 0c ). However, if there does not exist the futures 322 
market trading channel for the intermediate product, it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium 323 
wholesale price increases in both a  and 0c , whereas the equilibrium trading quantity between the 324 
manufacturer and the supplier increases in a  but decreases in 0c . When the futures market trading 325 
channel exists, based on an observed futures price, the ex ante (stage-0) committed trading in the 326 
futures market eliminates the impact of the expected downstream market demand and upstream 327 
production cost on the ex post (stage-1 and stage-2) bilateral contract relation between the 328 
manufacturer and the supplier.  329 
This independence result can be explained by examining the manufacturer’s and the supplier’s 330 
behavioral motivations in a more detailed fashion. For an increase of a  in a , as both the 331 
manufacturer’s and the supplier’s reaction curves shift upwards to the same degree ( /a B ), the 332 
manufacturer’s purchase in the futures market increases by /mfq a B    with a constant supplier’s 333 
sales to the futures market. These ex ante strategic commitments to the futures market trading of the 334 
manufacturer and the supplier lead to an unchanged ex post bilateral transaction between them. When 335 
the expected final market demand increases by a  and the manufacturer increases its futures market 336 
purchase by /mfq a B   , the manufacturer’s order quantity from the supplier remains the same for 337 
any wholesale price w  ( ( ) / 0sq w a    from (5)). This further eliminates the supplier’s motivation 338 
to raise the wholesale price ( / 0w a    from (6)). Thus, the trading quantity and wholesale price in 339 
the bilateral channel are independent of  a . Given this unchanged bilateral contract transaction, the 340 




by a . Thus, the supplier has no incentive to change her futures market sales, resulting in no impact on 342 
the contract negotiation (cf. (6)). In a similar way, one can explain why the equilibrium wholesale price 343 
contract is independent of the supplier’s expected cost ( 0c ). A higher 0c  reduces the supplier’s ex 344 
ante commitment to futures market trading quantity and this lower futures market sales buffers the 345 
supplier’s ex post motivation to raise the wholesale price (cf. (6)) in the bilateral contract negotiation 346 
stage, leading to a constant wholesale price. The unchanged wholesale price subsequently leaves the 347 
supplier with the same sales quantity in the bilateral channel. 348 
The independence result suggests that ex ante commitments to futures market trading of supply 349 
chain members automatically suppress their opportunistic tendency to modify the ex post wholesale 350 
contract relative to any change in the supplier’s expected production cost and/or the manufacturer’s 351 
expected final market demand. Note that each of these two factors influences the supplier’s wholesale 352 
price marginalization in a standard wholesale price contract setting. In contrast, in our current model 353 
setting, the price marginalization is immune to any change in the supplier’s expected production cost 354 
and/or the manufacturer’s expected final market demand. Thus, the independence result indicates that 355 
prior commitments to futures trading help mitigate double marginalization between the two supply 356 
chain members.  357 
Furthermore, one can verify that * ( , )w F kF  for all 1k  . The inherent rationale is that both 358 
parties’ ex ante commitment to futures market trading results in an equilibrium wholesale price that 359 
allows both parties to trade via the bilateral channel: *w F  implies that the supplier is willing to sell 360 
to the manufacturer and *w kF  gives the manufacturer a motivation to buy from the supplier. 361 




productivity shall presumably lead to a higher operational efficiency for the supply chain. The 363 
allocation of such efficiency gains depends on the futures price (F) and the level of productivity 364 
improvement (k).  365 
Corollary 1: If 1k  , the subgame perfect equilibrium reduces to * ( ) /mfq a F B  , 366 
*
0( ) /sfq F c A  ,
*w F  and * 0sq  . 367 
Corollary 1 shows that the futures market trading channel for the intermediate product completely 368 
overrides bilateral channel if 1k  . In this case, the equilibrium trading quantity in the bilateral 369 
channel ( *sq ) becomes zero. Recall that 1k   means that there is no relative DPI for the manufacturer 370 
based on his bilateral interactions with the supplier. Therefore, Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 jointly 371 
indicate that the existence of DPI, i.e., k > 1, is a necessary and sufficient condition for the bilateral 372 
contracting to arise as a viable channel in the supply chain and DPI can be viewed as an effective 373 
indicator for explaining when a positive bilateral transaction arises in the presence of dual channels in 374 
the supply chain.  375 
5. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 376 
In this section, we derive managerial insights based on comparative statics with regard to the futures 377 
price and DPI in a one-at-a-time manner. When there is no DPI in the bilateral channel (i.e., 1k  ), 378 
the supplier and the manufacturer would stop using the bilateral channel to trade the intermediate 379 
product in equilibrium (i.e., * 0sq  ) and the comparative statics in this case becomes trivial. Therefore, 380 
we will focus on the interesting case 1k   in this section. 381 
5.1 Impact of the Futures Price 382 




Proposition 2: If the futures price ( F ) increases, then for all 1k  , the equilibrium wholesale price 384 
( *w ) and the equilibrium quantity ( *sfq ) that the supplier sells to the futures market increase, but the 385 
equilibrium quantity ( *sq ) that the supplier sells to the manufacturer and the equilibrium quantity (
*
mfq ) 386 
that the manufacturer purchases from the futures market decrease. 387 
Proposition 2 is generally consistent with our conventional wisdom. That is, when the futures 388 
price (F) of the intermediate product increases, the supplier would like to sell more to the futures 389 
market (i.e., *sfq  increases), and the manufacturer tends to purchase less from the futures market (i.e., 390 
*
mfq  decreases). Facing a higher unit revenue (F) from the futures market, the supplier has stronger 391 
motivation to raise her wholesale price ( *w ) charged to the manufacturer, which induces the 392 
manufacturer to order less from the supplier (i.e., *sq  decreases).  Our result is aligned with the 393 
price-to-be-fixed contract used in transacting coffee of bulk grades between international traders and 394 
Tanzanian exporters. The contracted price in this bilateral channel equals to the futures price of the 395 
coffee at a particular point in time, plus or minus an agreed differential for quality difference (Bargawi 396 
and Newman, 2017). Moreover, a trader in this coffee supply chain, interviewed by Bargawi and 397 
Newman, acknowledged that “the futures price is the determinant all along the chain.” Similar 398 
price-to-be-fixed contract is also adopted by Starbucks (Starbucks 2010). Underpinned by the practices 399 
in coffee supply chains, Proposition 2 provides a theoretical support for Adcock’s (2006) appeal that 400 
the futures prices in the London Metal Exchange (LME) is ready to be used as benchmarks for both 401 
(upstream) producers and (downstream) consumers in their bilateral contract negotiations.  402 
The next proposition illustrates the impact of the futures price on the equilibrium performance of 403 




******** ))](([ mfsmfsmfsm FqqwqkqqkqbaE  , 
2**2* )(var mfsm qkq    405 
)( **0
****
sfssfss qqcFqqwE  , 
2**2* )(var sfscs qq  . 406 
Proposition 3: If the futures price ( F ) increases, then for all 1k  , the manufacturer’s expected 407 
profit ( *mE ) and the corresponding variance (
*var m ) of his profit in equilibrium decrease, but for 408 
the supplier, her expected profit ( *sE ) and the variance (
*var s ) of her profit in equilibrium increase. 409 
Proposition 3 shows that an increase in the futures price leads to a decrease in the manufacturer’s 410 
expected profit and risk (as captured by the variance), but it increases the supplier’s expected profit and 411 
risk. Intuitively, when the futures price increases, the manufacturer’s opportunity cost (buying in the 412 
futures market) increases, so the supplier would take advantage of this chance to charge the 413 
manufacturer a higher wholesale price. Therefore, an increased futures price drives the manufacturer’s 414 
procurement costs higher in both channels, thereby reducing his order quantities in the two channels. 415 
Thus, the manufacturer would have a lower profit and a lower risk. In contrast, an increase in the 416 
futures price leads to higher marginal revenues for the supplier in both channels which stimulates the 417 
supplier to expand her production, resulting in a higher profit with a higher risk. This suggests that in 418 
terms of expected profits, a change in the futures price does not induce a win-win situation for both 419 
supply chain members. Such asymmetric impacts on supply chain members’ profitability shed some 420 
light on supply chain relationship management: although the competitive futures market trading helps 421 
improve supply chain efficiency, it also brings possibilities for one supply chain member to take 422 
advantage of the other in negotiating the bilateral contract. A practical response to this issue is that 423 
about 2/3 of US companies have implicit contracts for prices or implicit understanding with their 424 





5.2 Impact of Downstream Productivity Improvement 427 
Now, we consider the impact of DPI on supply chain operations. For ease of discussion, we define, 428 
* * *
m s mfQ kq q   and 
* * *
s s sfQ q q   to represent the total equilibrium output volume of the 429 
manufacturer and the supplier, respectively. Then we have the following proposition. 430 
Proposition 4: If DPI (k ) increases, then (i) the equilibrium quantity ( *mfq ) that the manufacturer 431 
purchases from the futures market decreases; (ii) the equilibrium wholesale price ( *w ) increases; (iii) 432 
the manufacturer’s equilibrium total output volume ( *mQ ) increases, and (iv) the supplier’s equilibrium 433 
total output volume ( *sQ ) remains unchanged.  434 
Proposition 4 indicates that when the manufacturer enjoys a higher DPI from the bilateral channel, 435 
he becomes less dependent on the futures market, so he has a tendency to purchase less from the 436 
futures market. When the manufacturer becomes more dependent on the bilateral channel, the supplier 437 
can use it as a leverage to charge a higher wholesale price for each unit sold to the manufacturer. Due 438 
to the higher productivity improvement from the bilateral channel, the manufacturer’s total output 439 
volume is expected to increase. However, the supplier would keep her total output volume unchanged. 440 
Such asymmetric reliance of supply chain members on relationship-based productivity improvements 441 
are empirically observed in the B2B relationship management literature (Hingley, 2005; Nyaga et al., 442 
2010). When the manufacturer shifts more of his production of the final product from the futures 443 
market to the bilateral channel, it makes his demand for the intermediate product from the bilateral 444 
channel less elastic: for any change in the wholesale price set by the supplier, the change in the 445 




benefit from a higher wholesale price rather than from production expansion. Therefore, it is best for 447 
the supplier to charge a higher wholesale price but keep her total production volume unchanged.     448 
Proposition 5 below summarizes how the performances of the manufacturer and the supplier 449 
respond to a change in DPI. 450 
Proposition 5: If DPI ( k ) increases, then the manufacturer’s expected profit ( *mE ) and the 451 
corresponding variance ( *var m ) of his profit in equilibrium increase, but for the supplier, her 452 
equilibrium expected profit ( *sE ) increases with a constant variance (
*var s ). 453 
Proposition 5 demonstrates that the asymmetric reliance of the manufacturer and the supplier on the 454 
bilateral channel leads to different “wins” for them when DPI increases (i.e., k increases). As expected, 455 
both the manufacturer and the supplier achieve higher expected profits. However, the changes in the 456 
risks of their profits are quite different. As the bilateral-channel productivity improvement increases, 457 
the more powerful player, the supplier (the first mover in the bilateral contract negotiation), does not 458 
bear any additional risk, but the less powerful player, the manufacturer (the second mover), bears a 459 
higher risk. The reason is intuitive. The supplier can take the advantage of the less elastic demand from 460 
the bilateral channel to charge a higher wholesale price while keep her total output volume unchanged 461 
and, thus, she can avoid any additional risk. However, in response to the higher DPI in the bilateral 462 
channel, the manufacturer needs to procure less from the futures market and expand his total output 463 
volume and, thus, bears more risk facing uncertain final market demand. Our result is consistent with 464 
the imbalanced power structure explanation for the inequity in B2B relationship-based collaborations 465 
furnished by Collins and Burt (1999), Allen (2001), and Hingley (2005). In particular, Collins and Burt 466 




bear different levels of risks.  468 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 469 
Based on the assumption that direct interactions through the simple wholesale price contract in the 470 
bilateral channel may improve productivity for supply chain partners, we consider a two-echelon 471 
supply chain with an upstream supplier and a downstream manufacturer both engaging in dual channel 472 
(i.e., the bilateral channel and the futures market) transactions. In this paper, we first build a three-stage 473 
game to analyze the strategic interactions between the supplier and the manufacturer, then we derive a 474 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium in closed-form for the game. Finally, we discuss managerial 475 
implications obtained from comparative statics analysis. Our major findings are summarized below. 476 
The first finding establishes DPI as a necessary and sufficient condition to trigger and maintain 477 
the bilateral contracting relation between the two supply chain partners. This result furnishes an 478 
alternative productivity explanation for positive contract transactions on top of the strategic price 479 
impact of the spot market trading in Mendelson and Tunca (2007) and the strategic threats under 480 
trigger strategies in a repeated game setting in Taylor and Plambeck (2007a, 2007b). 481 
The second finding reveals that the prior commitments to futures market trading allow the 482 
equilibrium trading quantity and wholesale price in the bilateral channel to be independent of the 483 
downstream market size and the upstream unit cost (Proposition 1). Compared to the case without the 484 
futures market, this result demonstrates that the futures market trading effectively buffers the impact of 485 
any change in the downstream market demand and upstream unit cost on the bilateral contracting 486 
relation. This independence result implies that prior commitments in the futures market help mitigate 487 




The third finding demonstrates that an increase in the futures price increases the supplier’s 489 
expected profit and her associated risk, but it decreases the manufacturer’s expected profit and his 490 
associated risk. Therefore, the observed futures price can work as a valid indicator for supply chain 491 
managers to forecast the change of bilateral contracting relations and corresponding performance 492 
outcomes.  493 
The fourth finding indicates that an increase in DPI of the bilateral channel makes the 494 
manufacturer shift more of his procurement from the futures market to the bilateral channel. As a result, 495 
the manufacturer would have a higher expected profit together with a higher risk, while the supplier is 496 
able to seize a higher expected profit without incurring any additional risk.  497 
There exist a few directions to extend this research. For instance, our model here essentially takes 498 
a static view towards futures market movement. Once a futures price F is observed, it remains constant 499 
during the wholesale price contract negotiation. It is worthwhile to introduce a dynamic framework to 500 
examine how futures price evolution affects supply chain operations, especially when the wholesale 501 
price contract is subject to renegotiation. Another direction is to incorporate information asymmetry 502 
regarding supply chain members’ futures market trading activities.  503 
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APPENDICES: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS AND A ROBUSTNESS CHECK 575 
Appendix A：Proofs of propositions 576 
Proof of Proposition 1. 577 
We first calculate the stage-0 equilibrium. (9) can be rewritten as 578 
2 2 2 2 2 2
0
3 3 2 3 2
( )(3 ) ( )(3 ) (2 )mf
sf
k B A k B A q ck B A k B A a k B A F
q
k BA k B A A k B A
    
          (A1) 579 
Substituting (A1) into (12), we have 580 
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 583 
Substituting *mfq  into (12), (6) and (5), it is easy to verify the other equilibrium variables 
*
sfq , 584 
*w  and *sq .  585 
Second, we explore conditions to ensure *sfq  and 
*
mfq  to be non-negative. Since 
*
sfq  
given in 586 
Proposition 1 is continuous and strictly increases in B  with *sfq  as 0B  and  587 
0/)( 0
*  AcFqsf  as B , thus there exists a critical 
#B  such that  0* sfq  for all 588 
#BB  . Furthermore, since *mfq  given in Proposition 1 is continuous and strictly increases in a , 589 


















  591 
Finally, *w  and *sq  are clearly non-negative. Proposition 1 is thus proved.    □ 592 
Proof of Proposition 2. 593 
For 1k  , we first calculate * /w F  , * /sq F   and 
* /mfq F   as follows: 594 
* 2 2
2 2
(1 2 ) (1 ) (1 2) (1 1)
1
3 2 3 2
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Note that * 0sfq   and 0 0c   implies 597 
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We thus have 599 
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Proof of Proposition 3. 601 
For the first part, with the equilibrium variables given in Proposition 1, we have 602 
* * ***
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the fact that 2 2( 1) / 1k k   and 2 2 2 2(3 )( ) / (3 2 ) 1/ 3k B A k B A k B A    . 606 
Moreover, (5) implies 607 
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Therefore, we have / 0mE F   . Further, with (A2) and 
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 612 
where the inequality is due to * 0w F c  , 
* / 0sq F   , and 
* / 0w F   . 613 
Finally, we have 614 
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Proof of Proposition 4. 616 
Firstly, * /mfq k  , 
* /w k   and /mQ k   are derived as  617 
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Secondly, / 0sQ k    follows from 
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Thirdly, from Proposition 1, we have 621 
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Let 2 4 3 2 2( ) 3 2 7 2g k B k ABk ABk A     . Then we have 2 2(1) 3 5 2 0g B AB A      and 623 
2 3 2( ) 12 6 14g k B k ABk ABk     . Clearly, 2(1) 12 8 0g B AB     . To show that ( ) 0g k   for 624 
all 1k  , we need only to show that ( ) 0g k   has no real solution on (1, ) . Assume that there 625 
exists a solution to ( ) 0g k   on (1, ) . We must have 56 / 3A B . However, from Proposition 1, 626 
since 2( 1) / 1/ 4k k   and 2 2(2 ) / (3 2 ) 2 / 3k B A k B A    for all 1k  , then * 0sfq   for all 627 
1k   and  0 0c  implies 6B A . We thus have 56 / 3 28 / 9B A A  , leading to a contradiction.  628 
Finally, (5) implies that  629 
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.□ 630 
Proof of Proposition 5. 631 
For the first part, with the equilibrium solution given in Proposition 1, we have 632 
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where the second equality is due to (5). 634 
Then var /m k   is computed as 635 
* *












Thus, / 0mW k   implies 
* *( ) / / 0s mf mkq q k Q k       (see Proposition 4). By (A4), we 637 
have var / 0m k   . Furthermore, the first and third terms in the last equality of (A3) are positive, 638 
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For the second part, we can directly calculate /sE k  as  641 
* * ** ** *
* * * *
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642 
where the last equality is derived from the fact that * */ ( ) / 0s s sfQ k q q k       (see Proposition 4). 643 
Further, 644 
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                 (A6) 645 
Substituting (A6) and * /w k   in Proposition 4 into (A5), we have 646 
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 647 
Finally, var / 0s k   follows from the fact that 
* */ ( ) / 0s s sfQ k q q k       . □ 648 
Appendix B：The robustness of Propositions 1-5 to a setting of different futures prices 649 
In this appendix, we show that the results obtained with the assumption that the manufacturer (the 650 
supplier) buys (sells) at a same futures price are robust to the setting with different futures prices. 651 
Assume that the supplier sells at +F F  with ( , ( 1) )F F k F    while the manufacturer buys at 652 
F where F F   simply implies that the supplier sells at a positive futures price and 653 
( 1)F k F   ensures the possibility for the supplier and the manufacturer to trade via the bilateral 654 
channel (It will be more profitable for the supplier to sell all of its product to the futures market if it 655 
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where “*” represents the “equilibrium” solutions in Proposition 1. 660 
Clearly, these equilibrium solutions are continuous in F . This in turn implies that the 661 
continuity of the equilibrium expected profits and their variances in F . With this continuity, one can 662 
easily check that all the partial derivatives in the comparative statics analyses in Section 5 are 663 
continuous in F . Thus, there must exist a neighborhood ( , )F F  of 0F   ( 0F  ) such that 664 
for all ( , )F F F    , the signs of all our partial derivatives keep unchanged. Therefore, our results 665 
can be applied to situations where the futures-price differences are not too large (i.e. 666 
( , )F F F    ).  667 
